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INSIDERS, OPTIONS AND THE FIDUCIARY
PRINCIPLE: A RULE 10b-5 LOOPHOLE
I. Introduction
Insider trading' has long been associated with the American se-
curities markets. Corporate insiders who learn of material2 financial
information about their company before it is available to the investing
public' can earn substantial profits by trading securities on that
information.4 Although insider trading is unlawful,5 and has been
widely condemned as unfair and destructive to the fair operation
of the securities markets, 6 the practice continues.
1. " 'Insider trading' is the term commonly used to describe the act of pur-
chasing or selling securities while in possession of material nonpublic information
about an issuer or the trading market for an issuer's securities." INSIDER TRADING
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984, ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMM., H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 n.33 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2274, 2293 n.33 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 355].
2. Briefly, information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding his choice of action
in a particular securities transaction. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4232,
4234 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2294.
4. See id. at 2295.
5. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
6. The House report made the following observation:
Insider trading threatens [the securities] markets. By abusing the trust
and confidence, reposed in them by shareholders, employers or clients,
inside traders may reap huge profits in essentially risk-free transac-
tions. . . . The abuse of informational advantages that other investors
cannot hope to overcome through diligence or zeal is unfair and incon-
sistent with the investing public's legitimate expectation of honest and
fair securities markets where all participants play by the same rules.
H. R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2294-95. See generally Langevoort, Insider
Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Langevoort]; Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981) [hereinafter Wang].
Some commentators, however, argue that sanctions should not be imposed for
insider trading. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
111-58 (1966) (insider trading by high level management is essential incentive for
entrepreneurs); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory
and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1073-75
(1977) (insider trading increases flow of information to securities markets, thereby
increasing market efficiency).
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The recent surge of corporate takeovers has exacerbated the prob-
lem by creating frequent opportunities for insiders to profit by trading
on nonpublic information regarding pending takeover attempts.7 In-
sider traders reap substantial gains at the expense of investors who
trade securities without the benefit of the undisclosed information.'
Many of these investors trade stock, others, however, trade stock
options. 9 Both groups of investors may ultimately attempt to recoup
7. See Rogers, Leaders of Congress Doubt Boesky Case Will Force Major
New Trading Curbs, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 2, cols. 1, 2 (according to
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, "[tiakeover mania has spawned widespread abuses").
The House report drew the following conclusion:
Insider trading on United States securities markets is a serious problem,
especially in connection with tender offers. One reason is that the prospect
of enormous profits is a powerful lure. Another is the public perception
that the risk of detection is relatively slight. Moreover, Wall Street's
current merger wave creates countless opportunities for insider trading.
Because tender offerors typically offer substantial premiums over the
prevailing market price of the subject company's securities, anyone know-
ing of an imminent tender offer can acquire substantial profits while
incurring essentially no economic risk.
H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2295.
8. See, e.g., Hertzberg, Boesky May Get Substantial Tax Break From Part of
Settlement, Experts Say, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 2, cols. 1, 2 (Wall Street
stock speculators believe violator's insider trading profits exceeded $100 million
settlement with United States government); A Chronology of the Wall Street Scandal,
Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 10, col. 2 (between May 12 and July 1, 1986,
Securities and Exchange Commission charged three investment bankers with making
profits ranging from $120,000 to $12.6 million from insider trading) [hereinafter
Chronology].
9. In short, a stock option is a contract which allows its holder to buy or
sell stock at a specified price over a specified period of time. See STAFF OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKET TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION xxi (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY].
Insider trading in options is a little discussed yet firmly established practice. See
Stewart & Hertzberg, Street Bombshell: Inside-Trading Scandal Implicates High
Aides at Goldman, Kidder, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (investment
bank made millions of dollars in illegal profits through trading strategy involving
options); see also Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 157 (N.D.
IIl. 1985) (employees of Texas Instruments (TI) traded options on TI stock using
inside information that company was experiencing serious financial difficulties);
O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1182
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (insiders of issuer Amax and their tippees purchased options on
issuer's stock while in possession of material nonpublic information regarding
proposed merger); SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Stocks & Options of
Santa Fe Int'l Corp. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981), discussed in 14 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1717 (Oct. 8, 1982) (officer of issuer Santa Fe International Corp.
and his tippees traded options on Santa Fe stock based on confidential information
concerning prospective merger).
One commentator has noted, "[t]rading in [options] is particularly subject to
abuse of inside information because it provides opportunity for large gains relative
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their losses by suing the insider traders10 under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)' and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder. '2
The Exchange Act does not expressly prohibit trading on material
nonpublic information by insidels,' 3 yet its history suggests that the
prohibition of insider trading was an important purpose behind its
enactment.' 4 Likewise, Rule lOb-5 contains no express prohibition
against insider trading. 5 Nonetheless, the Rule has become the pri-
mary vehicle for imposing both civil and criminal sanctions against
insider traders. 16
The prohibition against insider trading is embodied in the "disclose
or abstain" rule-certain persons with knowledge of material non-
public information about an issuer's securities must either disclose
that information or abstain from trading in those securities.' 7 The
to the small amount of investment at risk." Note, Inside Information and Outside
Traders: Corporate Recovery of the Outsider's Unfair Gain, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
483, 506-07 (1985) [hereinafter Corporate Recovery]. For further discussion of
option trading, see infra notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
10. See Miller & Power, Boesky Case Expected to Bring Windfall For Lawyers
From Suits Claiming Losses, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 2, col. 1. "The Ivan
F. Boesky case has brought horrendous losses for some stock market speculators
.... Plaintiffs' lawyers are expected to file a blizzard of suits on behalf of investors
claiming they suffered losses because of Mr. Boesky's insider trading." Id. Attorneys
agree that the litigation stemming from recent insider trading activities will be
massive and widespread. See id. at 10, col. 2.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). For the text of § 10(b) and further discussion
regarding its application to insider trading cases, see infra notes 33-181 and ac-
companying text.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5 has been used to impose criminal
and civil penalties against insider traders, as well as to allow private recovery. For
the text of Rule lob-5 and a discussion of its application to insider trading cases,
see infra notes 35-181 and accompanying text.
13. See Corporate Recovery, supra note 9, at 487; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
kk (1982).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 1383]; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 792].
15. See Corporate Recovery, supra note 9, at 487; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5
(1987).
16. Rule lOb-5 has been used to sanction insider traders in both judicial and
administrative proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1981) (judicial decision), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); SEC v. Texas Gulf'
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971)
(administrative decision); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (same).
17. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. For further discussion of the
rule's development, see infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
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duty to disclose or abstain is not imposed on every possessor of
material nonpublic information. Rather, the duty arises only when
there is " 'a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and con-
fidence' " between the parties to a transaction." This concept, known
as the "fiduciary principle,"' 19 was established by the Supreme Court
in Chiarella v. United States.'
Chiarella involved insider trading in equity securities, or corporate
stock.' Insiders, however, may also trade non-equity securities such
as stock options.2 1 In at least one scenario in the options context,
the fiduciary principle leaves an insider trading loophole.
For example, investors will often hold stock options without own-
ing any shares of the underlying stock.2 1 Assume an option holder
trades his option to buy stock, a call option, on an impersonal
market, 24 to an insider of the issuer of the underlying securities.
18. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
19. Langevoort, supra note 6, at 3.
20. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. See id. at 224. The fiduciary principle tends to limit Rule lOb-5 liability.
See infra notes 113-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of developments in
insider trading law prior to the Chiarella decision. The principle does not, however,
allow an insider who trades stock without disclosing inside information to escape
criminal liability, nor does it affect a defrauded shareholder's right to recover from
an insider trader. Whenever an insider trades shares of his company's stock on
material nonpublic information without disclosing that information to the trading
shareholder, he has committed a fraud within the meaning of Rule lOb-5. The
insider shares a fiduciary relationship with all equity shareholders of the company,
for all shareholders have an ownership interest in the company. See O'Connor &
Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The insider's fiduciary duty gives rise to a separate duty either to disclose or to
abstain from trading on material nonpublic information. See Chiarela, 445 U.S.
at 228-29. His silence concerning inside information in connection with a trade of
shares constitutes fraud, and he will be subject to both criminal and civil liability
under Rule lob-5. Id.
Chiarella is a criminal case; however, in the wake of Chiarella, many courts
have reinterpreted the standards of liability in the judicially implied private cause
of action under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704
F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983). "As Chiarella makes
clear, 'liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.' " Id. (quoting Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 230) (emphasis in original); see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
719 F.2d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984).
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of insider trading
in options.
23. "[T]he option [holder] need not own any shares of the issuer of the underlying
security." Langevoort, supra note 6, at 41.
24. It is important to note that a face-to-face transaction may create a relationship
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The insider is in possession of material nonpublic information. The
information is later disclosed and the price of the underlying stock
rises far above the fixed exercise price of the call option. The insider
exercises the option and resells the stock at a large profit.
Because the option trader25 does not share a fiduciary relationship
with the insider, the insider has no duty to disclose material nonpublic
information to the option trader. Accordingly, under Chiarella, the
insider is neither criminally liable nor liable for damages under Rule
lOb-5.16
A reasonable interpretation and application of the principles de-
rived from the line of cases culminating in Chiarella, however, would
preclude such a loophole,2 7 and the insider would be subject to
either criminal or civil liability or both. Some courts, in accordance
with the policy of maintaining fair markets which underlies the
Exchange Act, distinguish Chiarella in order to close this options
loophole. 21 Other courts, however, adhere strictly to the fiduciary
principle and thus cannot effectively police informational abuses
connected to option trading.2 9
This Note analyzes transactions involving the purchase and sale
of option contracts by an insider possessing material nonpublic
information to determine whether the insider violates section 10(b)
or Rule lOb-5. Part II of the Note presents an overview of the
framework of Rule lOb-5 and, in particular, its enforcement in
insider trading cases. Part III examines the differing views espoused
by courts regarding the duty of disclosure. Part IV provides a general
discussion of options and the options market. Finally, Part V ill-
of trust and confidence between the parties. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying
text. No such relationship is created by a transaction on an impersonal market
such as an exchange. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
25. For the purposes of this Note, the term "option trader" will refer to the
person for whose account the option is traded.
26. "[lIt is virtually impossible. to prevent informational abuses involving [op-
tions] through application of the fiduciary principle." Corporate Recovery, supra
note 9, at 507. "Plainly, a narrow reading of Chiarella, foreclosing application of
the abstain-or-disclose rule to options trading, would open a large loophole for
insiders to profit from confidential information." Langevoort, supra note 6, at 42.
27. Before Chiarella established the fiduciary principle, some courts held that
an insider owes a duty to disclose to the investing public prior to trading on
material nonpublic information. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974). See infra notes 127-45 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Shapiro.
28. See, e.g., Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 163-64
(N.D. Ill. 1985); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
702, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
29. See, e.g., Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 411-12; In re McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Sec. Litigation, 567 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
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ustrates the loophole by presenting a typical options scenario. The
Note then suggests applications of insider trading law that effectively
close the options loophole.
II. The Framework of Rule 10b-5
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934306 " 'to
provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-
counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets . . . .' "I'
One way in which the Exchange Act regulates the securities markets
is through its antifraud provisions.32 The general antifraud provision
of the Exchange Act is contained in section 10(b)." Section 10(b)
is a broad provision which, among other things, gives the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) discretionary rulemaking author-
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982).
31. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (quoting
unattributed source). The interstate commerce requirement gives the Exchange Act
its jurisdictional means. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS 1337 (6th ed. 1987). The jurisdictional means has been
construed broadly; thus, the use of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate
commerce in connection with a securities transaction will invoke the protections
of the Exchange Act. For example, the telephone is an instrumentality of interstate
commerce. Id. Even an intrastate phone call in connection with a transaction may
be sufficient to invoke the Exchange Act. Id.
32. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982);
id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982); id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982). The antifraud
provisions prohibit the use of fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive practices in
connection with sales of securities. See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 401-514 (1985) [hereinafter HAZEN]. These provisions were enacted to
protect investors from both bargaining and informational disadvantages. See L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1435 (1961).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) proscribes fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
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ity.34 The SEC exercised this authority in 1942 to promulgate Rule
lOb-5.
Rule lOb-5,3 5 like section 10(b), is a flexible antifraud provision. 6
In sweeping language, the rule makes unlawful the use of any
fraudulent scheme, device, or practice in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.17 Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule
lOb-5 expressly prohibit insider trading," courts interpret the pro-
visions as encompassing a prohibition against such activity. 9
34. See id. Section 4 of the statute creates the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982). The SEC has authority to regulate the
securities markets through various means, including enforcement of the antifraud
provisions. See supra note 32.
35. Rule 10b-5 elaborates on the general provisions of § 10(b):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
36. The use of such general terms as "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,"
id., and "any act, practice, or course of business which would operate as a fraud,"
id., has allowed courts to apply Rule lOb-5 to various factual contexts. See, e.g.,
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969) (corporate mismanagement); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (insider trading); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (corporate mis-
representation).
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
The omission of a material fact and the making of an affirmative misrepresentation
in connection with the sale of a security are examples of fraudulent practices under
Rule lob-5. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153
(1971) (defendants' failure to disclose existence of more profitable market to plaintiffs
who sold stock was fraud under Rule IOb-5); Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513 (court
allowed private cause of action under Rule lob-5 against defendants who made
misrepresentations as part of conspiracy to induce plaintiffs to sell stock).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
39. "These antifraud provisions are not intended as a specification of particular
acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the
infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors
and others." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); see S. REP.
No. 792, supra note 14, at 9 (Exchange Act "aims to protect the interests of the
public by preventing directors, officers, and principal [sic] stockholders of a cor-
poration . . . from speculating in the stock [of that corporation] on the basis of
information not available to others"); see also H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note
19881
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A. Enforcement of Rule 10b-5's Prohibition Against Insider
Trading
Various sanctions, both official and private, may be imposed on
insider traders. The federal government may prosecute insider traders
for violating Rule lOb-5. 40 The SEC will often assist in the process
by turning over findings from its own investigations 4' to the United
States Attorney General.42 Convicted insider traders have received
prison sentences. 43
The SEC also pursues civil sanctions against insider traders under
authority granted by section 21 of the Exchange Act.44 The Com-
mission censures45 violators by publishing section 21(a) reports of
investigations, 46 imposes fines on insider traders47 and seeks injunc-
tions and disgorgement of unlawful profits.4 8 The Insider Trading
14, at 13 ("[m]en charged with the administration of other people's money must
not use inside information for their own advantage"); accord T. LEVINE & H.
PITT, SECURITIES LITIGATION 58 (1983) (one "principal purpose" of Exchange Act
was to prevent corporate insiders from profiting at expense of minority shareholders
by insider trading) [hereinafter LEVINE & PITT]. For further discussion of the
application of Rule 10b-5 to insider trading, see infra notes 40-181 and accompanying
text.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986)
(affirming conviction under Rule lob-5 for trade on misappropriated inside infor-
mation), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (4-4 decision); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1981) (reinstating indictment of insider trader).
41. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982).
42. Section 21(d)(1) contains the following provision:
The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available con-
cerning such acts or practices as may constitute a violation of any provision
of [the Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder to the
Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary
criminal proceedings under this title.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(l) (West Supp. 1987).
43. See, e.g., Stewart & Hertzberg, Levine Receives Prison Term, $362,000 Fine,
Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 2, col. I (convicted insider trader was sentenced to
two-year prison term) [hereinafter Levine Receives Prison Term]; Chronology, supra
note 8, at 10, col. 2 (four convicted insider traders were sentenced to prison terms
between November 6, 1986, and February 9, 1987).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982).
45. A censure is an official reprimand by the SEC. It is the "lightest admin-
istrative penalty available to it." Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
46. See SEC '80 VOLUME VIII 15 (R. Schlagman ed. 1980).
47. See Levine Receives Prison Term, supra note 43, at 2, col. 1; Chronology,
supra note 8, at 10, col. 2.
48. Section 21(d)(l) provides for injunctive relief:
[Whenever] it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged
or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any
provision of [the Exchange Act or] the rules or regulations thereunder
1988] INSIDER TRADING
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), 49 which amended section 21(d) of the
Exchange Act, empowers the Commission to seek a civil money
penalty for up to three times the amount of profits gained by the
insider trader, to be paid into the United States Treasury. 0 ITSA
applies to insider trading in any security, including options."
The foregoing are examples of enforcement commonly referred to
as "official" sanctions. Although these official sanctions are sub-
stantial, they have not succeeded in preventing insider trading. Private
enforcement of Rule lOb-5 thus provides a necessary supplement to
official sanctions. 52
Neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 expressly creates a private
civil remedy. 3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that
private actions aid in the enforcement of the securities laws.54 A
... it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court
... to enjoin such acts or practices ....
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987); see H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note
1, at 2296-97 (discussing SEC's use of injunction and disgorgement remedies).
49. ITSA is codified at § 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)
(West Supp. 1987).
50. The civil penalty provision of ITSA provides as follows:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated
any provision of [the Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder
by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material non-
public information . . . the Commission may bring an action in a United
States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to
impose, a civil penalty to be paid by such person .... The amount of
such penalty shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and
circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss
avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase or sale, and shall be
payable into the treasury of the United States.
Id. § 78u(d)(2)(A).
51. See id. § 78u(d); see also H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2298.
52. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
53. The Court made the following observation in Blue Chip:
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not by its terms provide an express
civil remedy for its violation. Nor does the history of this provision
provide any indication that Congress considered the problem of private
suits under it at the time of its passage .... Similarly there is no indication
that the Commission in adopting Rule lob-5 considered the question of
private civil remedies under this provision.
Id. at 729-30.
54. Id. at 730; accord Note, Rule JOb-5: Elements Of A Private Right Of
Action, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 541, 563 (1968) (private actions help to deter behavior
proscribed by Rule lOb-5) [hereinafter Elements Of A Private Right Of Action].
In the 1946 case Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., a federal district court held
for the first time that an implied private right of action exists under Rule lOb-5.
69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The private remedy subsequently flourished
in the federal circuits. See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d
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private remedy also provides compensation for defrauded investors"
and "serves to bolster public confidence in the securities markets." 5 6
B. Elements of the Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5
As a preliminary matter, in order to bring a private action under
Rule l0b-5, a private plaintiff "must allege and prove that he is
within the zone of interest Congress intended to protect, . . . and
that the injury is directly related to the alleged unlawful conduct." 57
In other words, he must have standing to sue."
Generally, a plaintiff is required to have been a purchaser or seller
of the securities that form the basis of the fraudulent activity that
violates Rule 10b-5.59 A mere lost opportunity to purchase or sell
securities will not satisfy the standing requirement. 6°
195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
Twenty-four years after Kardon, the Supreme Court officially confirmed the
private right of action under Rule lOb-5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("[iut is now established that a
private right of action is implied under § 10(b)"). The Court has recently stated
that a private Rule lob-5 action may be brought regardless of the availability of
an alternative express remedy under the securities laws. See Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
The private Rule lob-5 action has become "the primary private remedy for fraud
available under the Securities Exchange Act." HAZEN, supra note 32, at 445. Justice
Rehnquist, in Blue Chip, described the remedy in the following manner: "When
we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5 we deal with a judicial oak which
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737.
55. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
56. Elements Of A Private Right Of Action, supra note 54, at 563. Bolstering
public confidence in the securities markets is the primary motivation behind the
securities laws. Cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional
concern for public's legitimate expectation of fair securities markets).
57. LEVINE & PITT, supra note 39, at 20.
58. Id.
59. The requirements for standing in a Rule lob-5 suit were outlined by the
Second Circuit in a 1952 decision. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Under the Birnbaum rule, a
plaintiff must have purchased or sold securities in connection with the alleged fraud
in order to have standing to sue upon that fraud. See id. at 463-64; see also
HAZEN, supra note 32, at 450-51.
The Supreme Court adopted the Birnbaum rule in its 1975 decision of Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court gave several reasons
for the purchaser/seller limitation. The Birnbaum rule avoids vexatious litigation,
such as nuisance or "strike suits," and saves defendants from making in terrorem
settlements. The Court further pointed out that suits brought for lost opportunities
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An option does not merely afford its holder the opportunity to
purchase or sell securities; the option contract is itself a security.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,6' the Supreme Court
stated that "the holders of puts, calls, options, and other contractual
rights or duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized
as 'purchasers' or 'sellers' of securities for purposes of [R]ule lOb-5
.... ,6 In 1982, the Exchange Act was amended "to expressly
include options on securities within the definition of 'security'. ... "61
Defrauded option traders therefore have standing to sue under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 6" Once a plaintiff has established standing to
sue, he must then prove the elements of the cause of action-
generally scienter, materiality, reliance, causation and damages. 65
1. Scienter
Scienter is a necessary element of the lOb-5 cause of action. 66 The
Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,67 provided that a
Rule lOb-5 plaintiff must allege and prove an "intentional wrong-
are often based on oral evidence, making the proof of facts unduly difficult. See
id. at 739-44.
60. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731-33. The irony of the Birnbaum rule is that
those who lose an opportunity to realize a profit or avoid a loss may be the real
victims of an insider trade. See generally Wang, supra note 6, at 1217.
61. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
62. Id. at 751. The opinion further states that "the definitional provisions of
the 1934 Act themselves grant [options] such a status." Id. In truth, until 1982,
the Exchange Act's definition of "security" did not expressly include options. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1978). Options were,
however, generally recognized as securities. See H.R. REP. No. 626, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2780, 2782
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 626]; see also Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F.
Supp. 667, 671 (D. Mass. 1982); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. H.R. REP. No. 626, supra note 62, at 2780. The Exchange Act's definition
of "security" now provides: "The term 'security' [includes] ... any put, call,
straddle [or] option . . . on any security ...... Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (West Supp. 1987).
64. See, e.g., Backman, 540 F. Supp. at 671; O'Connor, 529 F. Supp. at 1186.
65. See generally HAZEN, supra note 32, at 445-75. The elements mentioned in
the text are generally required for the private cause of action. In enforcement
actions, however, the prosecution need only prove scienter and materiality. See
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-03 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985).
66. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-214 (1976).
The Court has also held that scienter is a necessary element in SEC enforcement
actions brought under Rule lOb-5. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
67. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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doing" by the defendant, that is, something beyond mere negligence. 6
The Court elaborated on the scienter element in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green69 by requiring a showing of intent to manipulate or
deceive.70 Notwithstanding the Court's emphasis on intent, the ma-
jority of circuit courts has held that recklessness is sufficient proof
of scienter under Rule lOb-5.7'
2. Materiality
Information omitted or misstated by a defendant must be material
in order to sustain a Rule lOb-5 claim." Information is material if
" 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would
consider it important' " in deciding his choice of action in the
transaction in question.73 Furthermore, a reasonable investor would
attach importance to information if, upon disclosure, the information
would "significantly alter[] the 'total mix' of information made
available." 7 4
3. Reliance
In general, in order to allege fraud in a Rule lOb-5 action, a
plaintiff must have acted in reliance upon a material misstatement
or omission by the defendant."5 The plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's misconduct was a significant, contributing cause of his
68. Id. at 214. The Court noted that certain circuit courts had held that
recklessness satisfied the scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
The Court declined, however, to address whether recklessness was indeed sufficient
proof of scienter. Id.
69. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
70. The Court made the following holding: "The language of § 10(b) gives no
indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation
or deception .... Thus [a] claim of fraud . . . states a cause of action under
any part of Rule lOb-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as
'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 473-74.
71. See HAZEN, supra note 32, at 459; see, e.g., Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1039 (1981); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978).
72. See HAZEN, supra note 32, at 461-63.
73. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4232, 4234 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1988) (quoting
T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
74. Id.
75. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); HAZEN, supra note 32, at 463.
19881 INSIDER TRADING
injurious trade. 76 Nevertheless, in nondisclosure cases such as insider
trading claims, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. 77 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,"8 the Supreme
Court held that in such cases the obligation to disclose, combined
with an actual withholding of a material fact, is sufficient to establish
the requisite element of causation in fact, or reliance. 79 Although
lower courts interpret Affiliated Ute differently, 0 the general trend
is to minimize the reliance element in nondisclosure cases.8 '
4. Causation
The concepts of reliance and causation are very closely related. s2
The causation element may be divided into two parts- "transaction
causation" and "loss causation." 83 In order to prove transaction
causation, which is substantially similar to reliance, 4 a plaintiff must
76. See Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d
Cir. 1981); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 319 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
77. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). Even
in cases involving affirmative misrepresentations, courts have eased a plaintiff's
burden of proving reliance by adoption of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory. See,
e.g., Basic, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4236-39 (plaintiffs' reliance on integrity of price set
by market, which had been manipulated by defendants' material misrepresentations,
created rebuttable presumption of reliance). For further discussion of the fraud-
on-the-market theory, see HAZEN, supra note 32, at 465-66.
78. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
79. Id. at 154; see also Basic, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4237 (restating Affiliated Ute's
presumption of reliance upon showing of nondisclosure and materiality).
80. Compare Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978) (Affiliated Ute
creates rebuttable presumption of reliance upon showing of nondisclosure and
materiality) with Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 319 (Affiliated Ute applies only to face-to-
face situations and otherwise requires positive proof of reliance) and Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Affiliated Ute dispenses with reliance requirement upon showing of nondisclosure
and materiality).
81. See HAZEN, supra note 32, at 463-64.
82. See LEVINE & PITT, supra note 39, at 50 ("[c]ourts often use the words
interchangeably to convey the same idea").
83. See Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984);
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975).
84. In a Rule lOb-5 context, reliance and transaction causation are parallel
concepts. If a plaintiff trades securities in reliance on a defendant's misstatement
or omission, it follows that the defendant's misconduct is a substantial cause in
fact of the trade. See Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: A
Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 672 (1965)
("proof of reliance may always establish that defendant caused the plaintiff's
conduct"). It is important to note, however, that there may be instances when a
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prove that the defendant's misconduct caused the plaintiff's trade
of securities.85 To prove loss causation, however, a plaintiff must
further prove that the defendant's misconduct caused his losses
sustained on the market.16
5. Damages
Finally, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff may recover damnages.8 7 The cus-
tomary measure of damages in a Rule 10b-5 claim is the plaintiff's
out-of-pocket loss. 8 In some insider trading cases, however, plaintiffs
have been allowed a restitutionary recovery.8 9 The insider's profits
are viewed as unjust enrichment, and must be disgorged to the
defrauded plaintiff. 90
III. Differing Views Regarding the Prohibition Against Insider
Trading Under Rule 10b-5
The insider trader's offense is his silence concerning material
nonpublic informatioi about his company's securities in connection
with his trade.9' A person's silence regarding nonpublic information
rmtay be considered f6audulent, hoxever, only if he is under a duty
to disclose the information to others. 92 Moreover, the duty to disclose
defendant's misco'ndtict will cause a. plaintiff's injury even absent actual reliance.
See R. CLARK; CORPORATE LAw 329 (1986). This is one reason why courts have
minimized the reliance requirement under Rule lOb-5. See id. at 330-31; see supra
notes 75-81 and accompanying text foi A discussion of reliance.
85. See Hatrock, 750 F.2d at 773.
86. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380.
87. See LEVINE & PITT, supra note 39, at 54.
88. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[i]n such cases of fraud by a fiduciary intended to induce others to buy or sell
stock the accepted measure of damages is the 'out-of-pocket' measure. This consists
of the difference between the price paid and the 'value' of the stock when [bought]
(or when the buyer committed himself to buy, if earlier)") (footnotes omitted).
See generally HAZEN, supra note 32, at 470-73.
89. E.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 879 (1965).
90. "[Tjhere can be no speculation but that the defendant actually made the
profit and, once it is found that he acquired the [security] by fraud ... lilt is
more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than
to let the fraudulent party keep them." Id.
91. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
92. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Compare Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 232 (in criminal action, Court stated "the element required to make silence
fraudulent [is] a duty to disclose") with Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics
Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (in civil case, Second Circuit stated "[tihe
party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty
to disclose it to the plaintiffs").
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arises only out of a special kind of relationship-a fiduciary rela-
tionship.91
A. Special Relationships Giving Rise to a Duty to Disclose
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a duty of disclosure
arises from a person's status as a fiduciary. 94 In 1909, in Strong v.
Repide,9 the Court held that a director of a corporation who knew
"special facts" affecting the value of shares and who concealed
those facts when he purchased shares, Violated his duty as a fiduciary
by failing to disclose those facts to a selling sharehdlder. 96 Diriectors,
officers and majority shareholders commonly have access to con-
fidential corporate information, 9 and hence are "traditional cor-
porate 'insiders.' "9g It is well settled that the§e persons owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.99
Courts have also created categories of non-traditional insiderg,
quasi-insiders, and miiappropriators upon whom thy' imnose a' fi-
duciary duty and thus the duty to disclose. Tip'pees, persons who
receive material nonpublic information from insideri,' are but one
example. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,' °l the Second Circuit held that tippees of a breaching insider
were subject to the same duty to disclose or abstain102 as the insider.13
93. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. A fiduciary relationship is -[o]ne founded on
trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979).
94. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 430-34 (1909).
"[Tlhe affirmative disclosure rule . . . is best seen as the legal judgment that a
person in a position of responsibility for the property or welfare of another should
act in that capacity solely for the best interest of the beneficiary-in other words,
a rule derived from the fiduciary's duty of loyalty." Langevoort, supra note 6, at
5.
95. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
96. See id. at 430-34. The "special facts" concept has evolved into the concept
of material nonpublic information.
97. See id.; see also HAZEN, supra note 32, at 419.
98. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
99. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983); Strong, 213 U.S. at
430-34; Moss, 719 F.2d at 10; O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
600 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
100. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 1974).
101. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
102. For a discussion of the "disclose or abstain" rule, see infra notes 113-25
and accompanying text.
103. See Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 237-38.
19881
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
Factual circumstances may exist where a defendant who is not an
insider is deemed to have a relationship of trust and confidence
with the parties to a transaction. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau,"' the Supreme Court recognized a fiduciary relationship
between an investment adviser and his clients to whom he had made
personal recommendations.1 5 In Affiliated Ute,"'6 the Court again
recognized such a relationship in a face-to-face transaction." 7 In
each case the fiduciary was required to disclose material facts to
the trading plaintiffs."0
Finally, the misappropriation theory, developed in the Second
Circuit in United States v. Newman,' 9 has been employed in criminal
and SEC enforcement actions in order to impose liability upon
outsiders for trading on confidential information.'"' The theory holds
that when an employee misappropriates confidential information
from his employer and then trades on that information, the employee
breaches a fiduciary duty owed to the employer. Moreover, the
activity is fraud within the meaning of Rule lOb-5."'1 The violation,
however, comes from the misappropriation and subsequent trade
rather than from a failure to disclose. 1 12
104. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
105. Id. at 193.
106. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
107. See id. at 152 (bank employees in whom plaintiffs placed their trust and
confidence were held liable for purchasing shares of plaintiffs' trust fund without
disclosing more beneficial secondary market). Most securities transactions are of a
more impersonal nature. Sales which occur in an impersonal market such as an
exchange or the over-the-counter market will not of themselves create a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
108. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153; Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 201.
109. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986)
(criminal action), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201
(2d Cir. 1984) (SEC action), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981) (criminal action), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983). While the misappropriation theory is widely employed in the
Second Circuit, some commentators have criticized the theory as too liberal an
interpretation of Rule 10b-5. See generally Note, The Misappropriation Theorv:
Rule lOb-5 Insider Liability for Nonfiduciary Breach, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049
(1987).
111. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 202-03 (court stresses that in enforcement action
it need not find duty to particular plaintiff).
112. See id. Materia suggests that the misappropriation theory would not be an
effective means of recovery for a private 10b-5 plaintiff other than the misappro-
priator's employer. See id. (court implied that private cause of action based on
misappropriation would fail because plaintiff could not show that defendant owed
him duty of disclosure). But see Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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B. The Duty to Disclose or Abstain From Trading
Since Strong v. Repide,"13 it has been well established that in face-
to-face transactions between a corporate insider and shareholders,
the insider's fiduciary relationship to the shareholders compels dis-
closure of material nonpublic information."14 It was not until an
SEC decision, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.," 5 in 1961, however, that
insider trading in the impersonal markets was held to violate Rule
lOb-5.116 The Commission concluded:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose] rests on two principal
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.' 17
The Commission relied on an insider's fiduciary duty of loyalty to
shareholders in imposing an affirmative duty to disclose material
information in order to enable a shareholder to properly evaluate
the consequences of his trade."8 The duty of disclosure, however,
is not an absolute one. If the insider abstains from trading on the
confidential information, he will not be subject to liability under
Rule lOb-5."19 The "disclose or abstain" rule of Cady, Roberts was
first adopted by the federal courts in 1968, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
In Chiarella, the majority did not reach the misappropriation issue because it found
that it was not properly introduced to the jury. Id. at 236. In his dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice Burger wrote: "I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass
and build on this principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading." Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This interpretation would allow a
private plaintiff to argue that he is owed a duty of disclosure.
113. 213 U.S.. 419 (1909).
114. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 5.
115. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
116. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 8. In Cady, Roberts, a director of Curtiss-
Wright tipped a broker-dealer that the company's board of directors had voted to
reduce the dividend for the next fiscal quarter. The broker-dealer immediately placed
sell orders on the New York Stock Exchange for some of his customers who held
Curtiss-Wright stock. The transactions were completed before the public was in-
formed of the reduced dividend. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909. Although
the broker-dealer was not a traditional insider, the Commission imposed upon him
"the responsibilities of those commonly referred to as 'insiders' " due to his
relationship with the tipping director. Id. at 912.
117. 40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnote omitted).
118. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 8.
119. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 915.
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Sulphur Co.' z° In Texas Gulf Sulphur,2 ' the Second Circuit expanded
the rule beyond insiders to reach anyone in possession of inside
information.' 2 This concept has been termed the "parity-of-infor-
mation" rule.' 23
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella, however, rejected the parity-of-
information rule. The Court held that "a duty to disclose under
[section] 10(b) [and Rule lOb-51 does not arise from the mere pos-
session of nonpublic market information.' '12 4 The Court made clear
that "a duty to disclose aris[es] from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction."' 25
C. To Whom is the Duty of Disclosure Owed?
It is now widely accepted that the duty to disclose or abstain
arises from a fiduciary relationship. 26 There are two views, however,
120. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). The rule was also extended to private actions under Rule 10b-5,
see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236
(2d Cir. 1974), and was ultimately confirmed by the Supreme Court. See Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980).
121. Officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. learned through an exploratory drilling
procedure that one of the company's properties had tested extremely well for an
ore discovery. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843-44. The officers purchased
stock without disclosing material nonpublic information concerning the drilling
results. Id. at 841-42.
122. The court interpreted Cady, Roberts very broadly. Because Cady, Roberts
had imposed liability on tippees who were not insiders, the Second Circuit concluded
that "anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public . . . or [if] he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information
remains undisclosed." Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
123. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-33. The rule is based on what the Second
Circuit viewed as the policy behind Rule lOb-5, "the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information .... ." Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d at 848. One commentator termed it "a fairness-oriented disclosure rule."
Corporate Recovery, supra note 9, at 489. The Second Circuit followed the parity-
of-information rule for over ten years, until it was implicitly overruled by Chiarella.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir.
1981) (court reaffirms Texas Gulf Sulphur rule); U.S. v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1364 (2d Cir. 1978) (Texas Gulf Sulphur rule is "black letter law"), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222, 237 (1980).
124. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-59
(1983).
125. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. In Dirks, the Court confirmed Chiarella's
fiduciary principle: "We reaffirm today that '[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the
relationship between parties' .... " Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 231-32 n.14).
126. One court that has followed the fiduciary principle has stated, "[tihe doctrine
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concerning the persons to whom the duty of disclosure is owed.
1. Shapiro-Duty Owed to the General Investing Public
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,27
Merrill Lynch was the managing underwriter of an offering of
Douglas Aircraft debentures.1 8 In confidence, Douglas advised Mer-
rill Lynch and certain of its officers, directors and employees of
material adverse information regarding the company's recent earn-
ings.'19 Merrill Lynch "tipped" the information to certain of its
customers, who knew or should have known that they were receiving
inside information.130 The tippees then sold Douglas stock on the
New York Stock Exchange before the information was disclosed to
the public.' Upon disclosure of the adverse information, the price
of Douglas stock dropped sharply.'32
The plaintiffs, investors who traded Douglas stock during the
period of insider trading,' brought suit against Merrill Lynch and
its tippees alleging that the defendants owed a duty of disclosure
to the "general investing public."'13 4 The case came before the Second
Circuit on the defendants' appeal from the district court's refusal
to render judgment on the pleadings.' 35
The court held that Merrill Lynch and its tippees "were under a
duty to the investing public, including plaintiffs, not to trade in or
to recommend trading in Douglas stock without publicly disclosing
that a duty to disclose or refrain from trading arises from a specific relationship
between two parties-and not simply from the fact that some investors have more
information than others-is now established in both state and federail law." Walton
v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980).
It should also be noted that while other courts agree that the duty of' disclosure
arises from a fiduciary relationship, they have not required a fiduciary relationship
between the parties to the transaction. See, e.g., Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
627 F. Supp. 154, 163-64 (N.D. III. 1985) (recognizing duty of disclosure to investing
public arising from insider's fiduciary duty to his corporation); O'Connor & Assocs.
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
127. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
128. Id. at 231.
129. Id. at 232.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 233.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 234.
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the revised earnings information which was in their possession.""',
This broad duty of disclosure was in accordance with the court's
view of Rule lOb-5's purpose, "to protect the investing public and
to secure fair dealing in the securities markets by promoting full
disclosure of inside information so that an informed judgment can
be made by all investors who trade in such markets."' 7
The defendants argued that since the plaintiffs lacked transactional
privity and could not prove reliance, the plaintiffs had failed to
prove causation. 3 The court rejected the privity argument 3 9 and
found reliance based on the defendants' duty to disclose coupled
with the withholding of material facts. 140
Although Shapiro found a duty owed to the entire investing public,
the court limited the scope of the defendants' liability through the
136. Id. at 240 (emphasis added). The opinion employed the Texas Gulf Sulphur
parity-of-information rule. Id. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the parity-of-information rule. The facts clearly indicate, however,
that Merrill Lynch stood in a fiduciary relationship with Douglas and its shareholders.
See Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 231-32.
137. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 235.
138. Id. at 238. For a review of the reliance and causation elements, see supra
notes 75-86 and accompanying text. In this instance, the court used the terms
reliance and causation interchangeably.
139. "[T]he common law requirement of privity has all but vanished from
lOb-5 proceedings while the distinguishable 'connection' element is retained." Shap-
iro, 495 F.2d at 239 (quoting Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90,
101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)). The court likely recognized
that matching buyers and sellers is extremely difficult in the impersonal market.
Therefore, refusing to create a buffer from liability, the court rejected a privity
requirement. Id. But see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). The Sixth Circuit refused to extend the private
lOb-5 remedy to impersonal market situations in which a plaintiff neither dealt
with nor relied on the defendant. Id. Fridrich has been read as requiring strict
privity between plaintiff and defendant. See Comment, Private Rule lOb-5 Recovery
for Open Market Insider Trading: The Propriety of Privity and Reliance Require-
ments, 15 SAN DIEoo L. REV. 751, 757-58 (1978).
140. See Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 238. The court cited Affiliated Ute, which minimized
the reliance element in nondisclosure cases. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying
text. But see Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 321. Fridrich denied recovery to plaintiffs who
could prove neither privity nor reliance. Id. The Fridrich court distinguished Af-
filiated Ute as being applicable only in face-to-face transactions. See id. at 318-
20 (court required positive proof of reliance in absence of prior dealings between
parties). Fridrich severely limits the liability of an insider who trades on an exchange.
The court believed that enforcement of the antifraud provisions was a task for
the SEC, and that only those plaintiffs who could prove actual injury should
recover damages. See id. at 320-21. Only the Sixth Circuit has followed Fridrich.
See Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 356 (N.D.
Ohio 1976).
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causation requirement.14' That is, only those claimants who traded
during the same period as the insiders were permitted to recover
damages from the defendants.412
Since Chiarella, however, the Second Circuit, in Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc.,' 43 has retreated from the Shapiro rule.144 Nevertheless,
some courts have continued to embrace the view that the duty of
disclosure is owed to the entire investing public.' 45
2. Chiarella, Dirks, Moss-Duty Owed to Those Who Stand in a
Fiduciary Relationship With the Insider Trader
Several cases have rejected Shapiro and have adopted a more
limited view as to the scope of the duty of disclosure. In Chiarella
v. United States,'4 6 the defendant, Chiarella, was an employee of a
financial printer.'4 7 Among the documents he handled were five
announcements of takeover bids with the names of acquiring and
target companies concealed or falsified to protect against their use.' 48
Chiarella nevertheless was able to deduce the names from other
information contained in the documents.' 49 Without disclosing this
information, he purchased shares of the target companies and im-
mediately sold them at a profit after the takeover attempts were
141. Causation here refers to "loss causation." See supra notes 83-86 and ac-
companying text.
142. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 241. This outcome suggests that only the losses of
those who trade contemporaneously with the insider are caused by the insider's
conduct. See Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94-95
(2d Cir. 1981) ("non-contemporaneous traders do not require the protection of the
'disclose or abstain' rule because they do not suffer the disadvantage of trading
with someone who has superior access to information").
143. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984).
144. See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
702, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("by virtue of their fiduciary duty to the corporation
and its shareholders, corporate insiders become subject to the separate duty to
either 'abstain or disclose.' . . . [Tihis additional duty to disclose is owed 'to the
investing public,' . . . 'to those investors trading contemporaneously with the in-
sider' ") (quoting Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 240, and Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94, respectively);
Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 163-64 (N.D. I11. 1985)
("[blecause the securities laws are designed to protect the entire open market ...
[the] duty [to disclose] is owed not only to the shareholders of the corporate
employer, but also to the investing public at large").
146. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
147. Id. at 224.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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made public.150 Following an SEC investigation of his trading ac-
tivities, 5' Chiarella was indicted and convicted of violating section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 52 The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction
based on the parity-of-information rule.' 53
The Supreme Court reversed'54 and rejected the Shapiro rule that
the duty of disclosure is owed to the investing public.' The Court
explained that the duty to disclose is imposed upon a party not
merely because he possesses material nonpublic information, but
because another party " 'is entitled to know because of a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.' 156
The Court held that Chiarella did not owe a duty of disclosure
because he did not stand in a fiduciary relationship to the share-
holders of the target companies.' It appears, therefore, that under
the fiduciary principle, the duty to disclose runs only to those who
stand in a fiduciary relationship with the party that trades on material
nonpublic information.'58
The fiduciary principle was reaffirmed by the Court three years
later in Dirks v. SEC.'5 9 In Dirks, a former officer of Equity Funding
of America (Equity Funding) tipped material adverse information
about the company to the defendant Dirks, a broker-dealer, and
urged Dirks to disclose that information publicly.160 Dirks investigated
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 225.
153. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Second Circuit employed Texas Gulf Sulphur rule in upholding
conviction). See supra notes 120-25 for a discussion of the parity-of-information
rule.
154. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237.
155. "We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the
mere possession of nonpublic market information." Id. at 235.
156. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
The Court based its ruling on the common law fraud doctrine. See id. at 227-29.
157. See id. at 232.
158. The Court explained its holding in the following manner:
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions
based on material, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad
duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty
arises from a specific relationship between two parties, . . . should not
be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislative
history of § 10(b).
Id. at 233 (citations omitted).
159. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
160. Id. at 649.
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Equity Funding and found its corporate assets to be vastly over-
stated. 161 Dirks did not trade in Equity Funding securities; 62 he did,
however, discuss the fraud with clients who then began to liquidate
their holdings in the company.' 6 The SEC investigated Dirks for
his participation and censured him for not disclosing the fraud.,6
Dirks sought review of the censure, which was upheld by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 65
The Supreme Court reversed, 66 and took the opportunity to re-
define tippee liability 61 and to reiterate the fiduciary principle es-
tablished by Chiarella.68 The Court reemphasized that the duty to
disclose arises from a specific relationship between the parties.'6
Chiarella and Dirks involved, respectively, a criminal action and
an SEC enforcement action brought under Rule lOb-5. 7 0 Neither
case addressed private recovery under the Rule, yet many courts
have incorporated the fiduciary principle into the cause of action.' 7 '
Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc." 2 illustrates the adoption of the fi-
duciary principle in the Second Circuit. In Moss, the defendant,
Morgan Stanley, was employed by Warner Lambert Co. to assess
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 650-52.
164. Id. at 651-52.
165. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646
(1983).
166. 463 U.S. at 667.
167. "[A] tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the
insider's duty." Id. at 659. A tippee such as Dirks does not "assume an insider's
duty to the shareholders ... [unless the information] has been made available to
him improperly." Id. at 660 (emphasis in original). The Court held that because
the officer did not personally benefit from his tip, he did not breach a duty to
Equity Funding shareholders, and, therefore, nor did Dirks as his tippee. Id. at
662. The Court gave the following explanation:
[A] purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate "use of inside in-
formation for personal advantage." . . . Thus, the test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain there has been no breach of duty to stock-
holders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.
Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
168. See id. at 654-55.
169. Id. at 657-58.
170. See id. at 650-52; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
171. See, e.g., Moss, 719 F.2d 5, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub noma.
Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp.,
704 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
172. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984).
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the desirability of Deseret Pharmaceutical Co. (Deseret), a potential
takeover target.'73 One Courtois, an employee of Morgan Stanley,
tipped information to certain other defendants of an imminent tender
offer for Deseret stock, and the tippees purchased Deseret shares
without disclosing that information. 174 The following day, Warner
Lambert announced a tender offer for Deseret stock and the de-
fendant-tippees tendered their shares, thereby reaping a substantial
profit. 75 The plaintiffs were Deseret shareholders who sold their
shares on the same day the defendants purchased Deseret shares.'76
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants owed them a duty of
disclosure. ,77
The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the complaint, concluding that because there was no fiduciary re-
lationship between the parties, the defendants were under no duty
to disclose the inside information. 71 The Second Circuit, relying on
Chiarella and Dirks, affirmed the decision.' 79 The panel agreed that
the insiders of the acquiring company and their tippees shared no
fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the target company
and that they therefore owed no duty of disclosure.' s" Moss is one
of many cases which has held that the fiduciary principle is applicable
in private causes of action under Rule lOb-5.""1
IV. The Stock Option
A stock option is a "contract which allows the buyer, by exercise,
to buy or sell stock (usually in 100-share units) at a certain price
(exercise or striking price) over a certain period of time, regardless
of how high or low the price of the stock (the underlying security)
moves during that time."'' 2 Options are reciprocal in nature. They
173. Id. at 8.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 8-9.
178. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1355 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd,
719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub noin. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984).
179. Moss, 719 F.2d at 12-15.
180. Id. at 12-15.
181. See, e.g., Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir.
1980). Moss appears to overrule the Shapiro rule in the Second Circuit. See supra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the Southern District of
New York later employed the Shapiro rule. See O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 702, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
182. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at xxi.
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create both a right in one party and an obligation in another.' 3
These rights and obligations end on the expiration date of the
option.'14 The option buyer pays a premium 85 to the option writer'8 6
in exchange for the contract.
An option giving its holder the right to buy underlying stock is
a "call option."'8 7 One which gives its holder the right to sell the
underlying stock is a "put option."'8 8 Puts and calls are the two
basic types of options; however, there are also more complex options
positions.189
Until 1973, options were sold only in the over-the-counter market
(OTC). 91' Options were negotiated individually between buyers and
sellers through broker-dealers, and accordingly were not standard-
ized.'1' The individualized nature of options made trading costly and
difficult. As a result, OTC options were rarely traded.' 9 Trading
of listed options-those traded on a national securities exchange' 93-
183. See id. at 76. For example, the holder of a call option has the right to
buy shares. The writer has the obligation to sell those shares to the holder if the
holder exercises his right to buy them. Id.
184. Id. at 78. Listed options have a maximum duration of nine months, but
they are usually written for shorter periods. As of 1979, over 60% of the existing
options volume had a duration of less than four months. See id. at 84.
185. See id. at 76. The premium is an absolute cost to the buyer. If he exercises
the option he will incur further transaction costs, e.g., commissions.
186. The writer of the option is the seller of the option. Id. at xxv.
187. This type of option allows the buyer to "call" upon the seller for shares.
Id. at 76.
188. The contract allows the seller to "put" shares to the buyer. Id.
189. The two may be employed in complex trading strategies. For example, a
spread is an options position created by the buying and selling of options of the
same class (a class being options of the same type, e.g., calls, that cover the same
underlying security), but which are of different series (a series being options of
the same class that have the same exercise price and expiration date). Id. at xvii,
xxiv. Another example is a straddle. A straddle is a combination option position
consisting of a put and a call of the same class and usually of the same series,
with both options exercisable separately. See id. at xxv. For further discussion of
the use of straddles, see id. at 123-24.
190. The OTC market is a network on which any registered broker-dealer may
act as a dealer. The National Association of Security Dealers' automated quotation
computer system (NASDAQ) lists quotations of market makers. Transactions may
be consummated by telephone communication with the market maker. See generally
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES 89-94 (Comm. Print 1973). See infra note
241 for a discussion of market makers.
191. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 73.
192. See id.
193. Id. at xx.
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began in 1973." 91 Unlike OTC options, listed options are standardized
and are easily traded.' 95
A secondary market in listed options is made possible both by
the standardized terms of the contracts, and because they are issued
and guaranteed by only one entity, the Options Clearing Corporation
(OCC). 196 The OCC stands as an intermediary between buyers and
sellers. 97 For example, when a call option is exercised, the writer,
or seller, of the option delivers the stock to the OCC. The OCC
then delivers the stock to the buyer. The buyer pays the exercise
price to the OCC and the OCC delivers payment to the seller. 9"
The parties to the transaction deal only with the OCC and not with
one another.
Options are most often used by investors as a substitute for short-
term purchases and sales of stock. 99 By using options, an investor
spends less on transaction costs2'0 because commissions are lower
for options transactions.20 ' This in turn enables (using calls as an
example) the option trader to obtain a much larger position in a
stock, with a limited amount of capital expenditure, than he would
if he were simply buying shares.0 2
The buying of call options, however, "entails a substantially higher
degree of risk than does the simple investment in the underlying
stock because relatively large increases in the price of the underlying
194. See id. at 1.
195. A special study of the options market for the SEC drew the following
conclusions:
Listed options differ from conventional options in several important ways
including: 1) a liquid secondary market exists for the trading of listed
options; 2) transaction costs associated with listed options are lower than
those for conventional OTC options; and 3) up-to-date quotations and
transaction prices on listed options are obtainable, during the trading
day, through quotation and price reporting services found in brokerage
firms; and closing prices are available through newspapers.
Id. at 73.
196. See id. at 74.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2782.
200. Transaction costs are the expenses incurred from the purchase or sale of
securities, of which commissions represent the largest part. See SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 9, at xxv.
201. "IT]he dollar amount of commissions on an option will be less than on a
stock trade in an equivalent number of shares underlying the option." Id. at 89.
202. See id. at 109; see also Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d
407, 410 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983) ("options are bought because
they offer an investor a potential profit from a limited dollar exposure").
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stock are required if the buyer is to profit from this activity. ' 2', 3
Although the cost of the option is a relatively small investment for
the trader, he nevertheless stands to lose his investment completely
if he holds the option for its duration.2°4 Of course, the risk is
balanced against the lower cost and potentially high profitability of
investing in options.
An option holder may elect to sell the option at any time.2 °0 Its
price reflects the market value of the rights transferred. °6 An option's
price will be affected by the same factors which influence the price
of the underlying stock.2 °7
V. Insider Trading in Options: The Loophole
The SEC recognized the potential for abuse in options trading
when it warned in 1979 that "[t]he leverage offered by options,
which permits substantial percentage gains on a small capital in-
vestment, and the existence of a liquid market for options have
created new opportunities for profitable options trading based on
nonpublic market information. ' 208 In the legislative history of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), 0 9 Congress noted
that "the purchase of options permits the violator to obtain far
larger illegal profits than would be possible through purchases of
the same dollar amount of common stock." 2t 0 Option trading is
generally highly speculative. An investor accepts the risk that the
price of a stock might not reach the level necessary for exercise of
the option to become profitable because his rewards will be great
if the price does change accordingly. The insider, however, can trade
203. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 108.
204. See id. at 109; see also Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 410. The holder of a call
option will not exercise his option unless the price of the underlying stock rises
to a profitable level above the exercise price.
205. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, ai 73 (liquid secondary market exists for
trading listed options).
206. See id. at 90. For a more detailed discussion of options pricing, see id. at
90-95.
207. For example, the announcement of a takeover bid will substantially increase
the price of a call option on the target company's stock. See H.R. REP. No. 355,
supra note 1, at 2296 n.38.
208. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 9, at 183; see also Corporate Recovery, supra
note 9, at 506-07 ("[t]rading in [options] is particularly subject to abuse of inside
information because it provides opportunity for large gains relative to the amount
of investment at risk").
209. For a discussion of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, see supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
210. H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note I, at 2295-96.
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options with essentially no risk involved. He is like the gambler who
bets on an event after its occurrence, but before the public knows
it has occurred. For example, in a takeover situation, tender offerors
offer substantial premiums over the prevailing market price of the
target company's securities .2 1 The insider of a target company, well
aware of this, knows that an impending tender offer for the stock
is sure to exceed the exercise price of call options on his company's
stock written in accordance with the pre-offer market price. 212 More-
over, the price of the options themselves will increase dramatically. -2 1
The insider may trade options on his company's stock based on this
material nonpublic information in the same way he might trade the
stock itself. The irony is that while he would violate Rule l0b-5
for trading stock without disclosing the information, he would not
violate the Rule by trading options. 24 Hence, the fiduciary principle
creates an options loophole. 21
A. The Trade
The following hypothetical illustrates the loophole as it exists in
the secondary market: On December 1, 1987, Plaintiff (P) buys 100
call. options written on X Co. stock from the OCC. The options
are written by W, who sold the options to the OCC. The options
are exercisable at fifty-five dollars per share, and on the purchase
date and throughout the month of December, X Co. stock sells for
fifty dollars per share. On January 1, 1988, Y Co.'s takeover proposal
comes before the board of directors of X Co. Y Co. offers sixty-
five dollars per equity share. On January 2, 1988, before the board
reaches a decision, Director (D), a director of X Co., places an
order with his broker to buy 100 call options on X Co. stock, for
100 shares each, with an exercise price of fifty-five dollars per share.
The broker buys 100 call options from P via the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE). On January 3, 1988, along with the
announcement of the takeover bid, the X Co. board announces its
211. Id. at 2295.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 2295-96.
214. See infra notes 216-23 and accompanying text. This discussion will focus
only on § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. It does not suggest that the insider is necessarily
free from liability under other provisions of the securities laws.
215. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 42 (strict application of fiduciary principle
"would open a large loophole for insiders to profit from confidential information'");
Corporate Recovery, supra note 9, at 507 ("it is virtually impossible to prevent
informational abuses involving [options] through application of the fiduciary prin-
ciple").
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decision to accept the offer. If D exercises the call options, the
OCC will deliver to him 10,000 shares of X Co. stock. The OCC
will in turn call on W to deliver 10,000 shares of X Co. stock. D
may immediately resell the stock to Y Co., thereby realizing a profit
of nearly $100,000 after transaction costs are deducted. He may
also decide to merely sell the call options, the value of which would
increase proportionately with the increase in the price of X Co.
stock following the announcement of the tender offer. This strategy
would still allow D a substantial profit with only a minimal capital
expenditure. 2 6
D, as a director of X Co., is clearly a traditional insider." 7 His
acts are contemptible, yet, arguably, not illegal under the fiduciary
principle. Moreover, D will not be liable to P, the option trader," 8
for his trade on material nonpublic information.
B. The Loophole Under the Fiduciary Principle
P may bring suit against D, alleging that had P known of the
inside information, he would not have traded the options. In order
to prevail under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, P must prove that
D committed a fraud by his nondisclosure.21 9 D, however, was under
no duty to disclose to P because he did not stand in a fiduciary
relationship with P: 22 0
While it is true that shareholders and options traders both rely
on the fortunes of corporrations, the dispositive distinction is that
the options trader has no equity interest in the corporation by
virtue of his selling or purchasing an option on the corporation's
stock. He is owed no special duty by the officers and directors
of the corporation because, quite simply, the corporation is not
run for his benefit. He has contributed no equity to the corporation
216. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
218. The option trader is the previous holder of the options, for whose account
they were sold. In this hypothetical, the option writer has no cause of action, for
he could not prove the requisite causation element. The information regarding the
takeover bid did not exist at the time the options were written on December 1,
1987. He was, therefore, in no way effected by D's nondisclosure on January 1,
1988. The possibility that the market price of the underlying stock may be inflated
by the announcement of a tender offer is an inherent risk of writing call options.
219. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
220. "[A] duty to disclose aris[es] from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
(1980); see O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179,
1184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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. Whatever relationship this may create with the corporation,
it cannot be said that it rises to the level of a relationship of
trust and confidence between the options trader and the corporate
insider. In short, as a shareholder one is entitled to the benefits
of a trust relationship. As an options trader, one is not.22
Chiarella makes clear that the duty to disclose arises from a fiduciary
relationship between parties to a transaction. 212 Since there is no
fiduciary relationship between an insider and an option trader, an
insider could theoretically trade solely in options and not violate
Rule lOb-5.2 13
C. Alternative Resolutions
Insiders should not be allowed to exploit investors. Courts may
employ theories other than the fiduciary principle which would
prevent an insider from trading options on inside information with
impunity.
1. The Misappropriation Theory
The Second Circuit has used the misappropriation theory2 4 to
expand insider trading liability beyond the reach of the fiduciary
principle. Courts have recognized that an employee who misappro-
priates confidential corporate information has breached his fiduciary
221. O'Connor, 529 F. Supp. at 1184-85.
222. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. A fiduciary relationship could not have
been created from the circumsiances of the trade itself. The OCC, acting as an
intermediary for all options transactions; precludes dealings between the parties.
See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text: Likewise, the trade's execution on
an impersonal exchange supports the conclusion that it was nothing more than an
at-arm's-length business transaction. In such a transaction, neither party has a duty
to disclose to the other absent some fiduciary relationship. See Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
223. In this hypothetical, there could be no criminal liability, no civil penalties,
and no private liability. This Note, throughout its entirety, has demonstrated that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly limited Rule lOb-5 liability. See, e.g., Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (duty to disclose arises not from mere
possession of inside information, but from fiduciary relationship between parties
to transaction); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (only conduct
involving manipulation and deception violates Rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting standing to purchasers and sellers
of securities). In Chiarella, the Court espoused too narrow a view of the duty of
disclosure. It is doubtful that the Court intended to create the loophole, but the
fiduciary principle does just that. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
1988] INSIDER TRADING
duty to the corporation. 25 This breach has been held to constitute
a fraud within the meaning of Rule 10b-5, 2 6 and will support a
conviction under the Rule. 221 In the hypothetical above, D misap-
propriated the information regarding the takeover bid; therefore,
under the misappropriation theory, he would be criminally liable
under Rule lOb-5.
In Carpenter v. United States,2 1 the Supreme Court upheld a
conviction based on the misappropriation theory. 2 9 The misappro-
priation issue, however, was decided by a divided Court.230 While
Carpenter thus provides no binding precedent in favor of the mis-
appropriation theory,23' it leaves intact those Second Circuit decisions
that advance the theory. 232
225. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d. Cir. 1986), aff'd,
108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16-18 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
226. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
227. See, e.g., Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1036 (Second Circuit upheld convictions
based on misappropriation theory).
228. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
229. Id. at 320,
230. Id. In Carpenter, defendant Winans misappropriated confidential infor-
mation, to be published in a daily newspaper column, from his employer, the
Wall Street Journal. Id. at 319. Winans tipped certain information, before pub-
lication, to other defendants who traded on the information. Id. The defendants
were convicted for Violations of Rule lOb-5, under the misappropriation theory,
and sections of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. United States v. Winans,
612 F. Supp. 827, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd,
108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). The convictions were affirmed by the Second Circuit,
Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987), and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Carpenter v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986). The Justices split 4 to 4 on the misappropriation issue. They therefore
upheld the Rule lOb-5 convictions without opinion. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320.
The Court, however, unanimously affirmed the mail fraud convictions, such af-
firmance constituting the opinion. Id.
231. See Taylor, Justices, 8-0, Back U.S. on Conviction of Wall St. Writer,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 6 [hereinafter Justices Back Conviction];
see also id. at DII, col. 5 ("the deadlock on the securities fraud issue leaves open
the possibility that the Court may someday, in some other case, reject the Gov-
ernment's broad 'misappropriation' theory"); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.5, at 33 (1986) [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA].
Commentators have recognized the weakness of the Carpenter decision and have
urged legislation that would codify the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., Nash,
'Insider' Definition in New Law Urged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at DIO, col.
2 (Senator Alfonse D'Amato, co-sponsor of insider trading bill, stated on day
Carpenter decision was handed down, "[Carpenter] is hardly a ringing endorsement
of the S.E.C.'s misappropriation theory. We need a [statutory] definition [of insider
trading] more today than yesterday"). A proposed amendment to the Exchange
Act would codify the misappropriation theory and thereby enable the government
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Although the misappropriation theory is effective in providing
criminal liability for insider trading in options, it does not provide
a remedy for option traders. The theory does not impose a duty
of disclosure on the violator; therefore, the option trader cannot
prove that a fraud was perpetrated upon him.2 3
2. The Shapiro Rule
The Shapiro rule 234 is similar in reasoning to the misappropriation
theory but includes a duty of disclosure. D would be both criminally
and civilly liable under the Shapiro rule. By breaching his fiduciary
duty to X Co., D, by his trade, has committed a fraud in connection
with the purchase of a security. He may therefore be held criminally
liable for his misappropriation and trade.2 1 Shapiro adds to the
misappropriation theory the separate duty to disclose the inside
information or abstain from trading in the corporation's securities.
This duty is owed to the entire investing public. 21 6 Recovery, however,
is limited to those members of the investing public who can show
causation-that is, those who traded contemporaneously with the
insider. 23 7 P is certainly a member of the investing public; moreover,
to prosecute insider options traders in all the circuits, rather than only in the
Second Circuit. The proposed amendment contains the following proscription:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person ... to use material, nonpublic
information to purchase or sell any security, by the use of any means
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . if such person knows or
is reckless in not knowing that such information has been obtained
wrongfully, or if the purchase or sale of such security would constitute
a wrongful use of such information. For the purposes of this section,
information shall have been used or obtained wrongfully only if it has
been obtained by, or its use would constitute ... theft, conversion,
misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual, employment,
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence.
S. 1380, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 16(b)(l) (1987) (emphasis added).
232. See Justices Back Conviction, supra note 231, at DII, col. 4; see also
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 231, § 2.5, at 33. See supra notes 10-12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Second Circuit misappropriation cases.
233. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
234. The rule provides that one who acquires inside information pursuant to a
fiduciary relationship owes a duty to the investing public to disclose that information
or to abstain from trading. See supra notes 127-45 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
236. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
240 (2d Cir. 1974).
237. See Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94-95 (2d
Cir. 1981); Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 241. The courts have determined that a plaintiff
must trade in the same market as a defendant in order to trade contemporaneously.
See Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert.
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by trading options during the period of D's option trading, he has
traded contemporaneously with D.
This line of reasoning was recently endorsed by two federal district
courts in decisions regarding claims by option traders against insider
traders. 238 These courts distinguished Chiarella and embraced Shapiro
in order to prevent the injustice of allowing both the violator to
escape civil liability and the plaintiff's injury to go unredressed.23 9
Courts have criticized the Shapiro rule,240 yet it remains the most
effective authority for policing insider trading in options transactions.
Congress has expressed concern over insider trading in options through
its enactment of ITSA.2 41 Preliminary drafts of ITSA expressly pro-
denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Starkman v. Warner Communications, Inc., No. 85-
7949, slip op. at 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1987); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Since D traded
options, P may show the requisite causal connection. See Laventhall, 704 F.2d at
412; Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 164 (N.D. IlI. 1985).
238. See Bianco, 627 F. Supp. at 164; O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 702, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Other courts have refused to adopt Shapiro in lieu of Chiarella's fiduciary
principle, and as such, have denied option traders a remedy against insider traders.
See, e.g., Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 411; In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec.
Litigation, 567 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
239. In a rehearing of O'Connor, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York distinguished Chiarella and the Second Circuit case Moss, which also
embraces the fiduciary principle. The court contended that the fiduciary principle
was meant only for cases involving persons other than traditional corporate insiders.
See O'Connor, 600 F. Supp. at 703-04. The court then applied Shapiro. Id. at
703.
In Bianco, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois distinguished
Chiarella in the same manner as O'Connor. See Bianco, 627 F. Supp. at 163. The
court then cited O'Connor's interpretation of the Shapiro rule in denying defendants'
motion to dismiss. Id. at 164.
240. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983) (Court stated that
duty to disclose arises from specific relationship between parties, refusing to recognize
general duty between market participants); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 232-33 (1980) (same); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13 (2d Cir.
1983) (employee's duty to his employer should not be stretched to encompass duty
of disclosure to general public), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984).
One commentator has noted, "there is no logical reason why a trade by the
defendant should create such an immense quasi-Samaritan obligation. The trade
does not create any relationship with all other investors." Wang, supra note 6, at
1262 (emphasis in original). It should also be noted, however, that the Shapiro
concept of a broad duty is properly limited by causation. See supra notes 141-42
and accompanying text. The common law negligence doctrine has endured through
many more years of criticism using the similar concept of duty limited by proximate
cause. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 28-45, at 160-321 (1984).
241. See generally H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2295-96. In the legislative
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vided for sanctions against insider traders of options and other
enumerated securities.2 42 Presently, ITSA simply addresses insider
trading of any security, 243 the definition of which includes options.
244
A strict application of the fiduciary principle, however, would leave
ITSA powerless against insider trading in options. ITSA's civil money
penalty provision is implicated only when there has been a violation
of the Exchange Act. 245 Only Shapiro or the misappropriation theory
can adequately arm ITSA against options fraud. The SEC, in ad-
ministrative decisions, has also expressed a policy of discouraging
insider trading in options. 246 In light of these policies, courts should
assist in punishing insider traders who exploit the options market.
They can best do so by adopting the Shapiro rule.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court once proffered that "Congress intended se-
curities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be
construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
its remedial purposes.' ",247 Since that time, however, the Court has
done much to contradict itself.248 The fiduciary principle is a prime
example. Although it is highly unlikely that the Court intended to
create an insider trading loophole, it has indeed done so in the area
of option trading. Unquestionably, allowing insiders to exploit the
history of ITSA, Congress expressed special concern for market makers. Id. at
2295. Briefly, market makers are dealers who hold themselves out as being willing
to buy and sell securities for their own accounts on a continuous basis. See SPECIAL
STUDY, supra note 9, at xx. By doing this, they provide market liquidity, thus
creating an orderly market for the benefit of all investors. See H.R. REP. No.
355, supra note 1, at 2295. "[M]arket makers cannot protect themselves from inside
traders. . . . [Ilnsider trading is ... likely to cause market makers in options to
be less willing to bid for or to offer options. A decrease in the number of market
makers would increase the cost of legitimate option transactions." Id.
242. See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 1, at 2298.
243. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987). For a more detailed discussion
of ITSA, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). Presumably, the change in the language
of ITSA was made upon amendment of the definition of "security" under the
Exchange Act.
245. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
246. See SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Stocks & Options of Santa Fe
Int'l Corp. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981), discussed in 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1717 (SEC imposed sanctions on insider option traders); cf. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1987) (giving SEC power to impose civil money penalty on insider
traders who trade options and other securities).
247. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
248. See supra note 223.
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options market at the expense of innocent investors is unjust. Courts
should therefore attempt to close the option trading loophole by
imposing official sanctions on violators through the misappropriation
theory and should further permit private Rule lOb-5 actions by
adopting Shapiro's duty to disclose inside information to the investing
public. Subjecting violators to criminal and civil liability would be
both desirable and fair, for the securities laws were meant to protect
the public from those who would use inside information for their
own advantage.24 9
Eric B. Lesser
249. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 14, at 13.
-r
